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abstract: In this paper I review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry, 
specifically in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5). First, I examine the contraposition between sex and gender, and 
argue that it is still retained by DSM-5, even though with some caveats. Second, I 
claim that, even if genderqueer people are not pathologized and gender pluralism is 
the background assumption, some diagnostic criteria still conceal a residue of gender 
dualism and essentialism. Third, I consider gender dysphoria, which is characterized 
by an incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned 
gender; since this condition pertains to distress and disability, not to the incongruence 
per se, it does not pathologize transgender people. Still, I contend that it should be 
removed from DSM-5 for theoretical reasons. 
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In this paper I critically review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry. 
More precisely, I focus on the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM-5)1 only, as at present it is the most acknowledged psychiatric 
nosological manual, widely used by psychiatrists all over the world. 
First, I examine the contraposition between sex, which is generally taken to be a 
purely biological notion, and gender, which is instead used to refer to psychological, 
social, and cultural aspects related to biological sex. This contraposition, which 
has been questioned by various feminist scholars2, is still retained in DSM-5, 
even though with some important caveats. Second, I evaluate whether DSM-5 is 
committed to gender dualism or gender pluralism and argue that, even if genderqueer 
people are not pathologized and gender pluralism can be regarded as the background 
assumption, some diagnostic criteria still conceal a residue of gender dualism 
and gender essentialism. Third, I consider gender dysphoria, a mental disorder 
characterized by a marked incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed 
gender and one’s assigned gender. As this mental disorder pertains to distress and 
disability, not to the incongruence per se, transgender identities are not pathologized 
in themselves, but only if associated with distress and disability. However, I argue 
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against the opportunity to consider gender dysphoria a mental disorder, at least 
from a theoretical point of view. Finally, I summarize how the notion of gender is 
conceived in DSM-5.
1. Sex and gender
Very roughly, the term “gender” is generally used to refer to psychological, social, 
and cultural aspects related to sex, which is instead regarded as a biological category. 
In what follows, I will use male/female to refer to sex categories and man/woman to 
refer to gender categories. If being a male/female is considered just a biological matter, 
being a man/woman also depends on social, cultural, and historical practices, that may 
also intersect with other variables, such as “race”, social class, ethnicity, nationality, 
or religion3. In this sense, sex and gender are taken to be two different and, to a certain 
extent, independent categories. So, a particular individual may be a male/female and 
still identify with, experience, or express the gender woman/man4. 
In popular and academic literature, especially outside philosophy, the two terms 
are often used interchangeably. Psychiatry is not an exception. In DSM-5, sex and 
gender are explicitly recognized as two different categories5, the former pertaining 
to the biological aspects of people, the latter to the psychological, social, and cultural 
ones; at the same time, however, sex and gender are frequently conflated in common 
psychiatric usage. Moreover, the DSM-5 taskforce has decided to use the term gender 
to cover not only social, cultural, and historical aspects, but also biological ones6. This, 
however, can be confusing. Let’s look at some DSM-5 gender-related definitions:
Gender: the public (and usually legally recognized) lived role as boy or girl, man 
or woman. Biological factors are seen as contributing in interaction with social and 
psychological factors to gender development. 
Gender assignment: the initial assignment as male or female, which usually occurs at 
birth and is subsequently referred to as the “natal gender”. 
Gender experience: the unique and personal ways in which individuals experience their 
gender in the context of the gender roles provided by their societies. 
Gender expression: the specific ways in which individuals enact gender roles provided 
in their societies. 
Gender identity: a category of social identity that refers to an individual’s identification 
as male, female or, occasionally, some category other than male or female7. 
Gender experience, expression, and identity (the self-attribution of gender) clearly 
detail some aspects related to the notion of gender; all of them strongly depend on 
psychological, social, and cultural features. Gender assignment, on the contrary, 
somehow resembles the notion of sex, as the initial assignment as male or female is 
mainly related to biological features, such as chromosomes and genitalia (external and 
internal). Still, using “gender assignment” or “natal gender” instead of “sex” suggests 
that deciding what sex a particular individual is always involves not only descriptive 
considerations but also evaluative judgments8. 
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Despite the above ambiguities, DSM-5 retains a minimal contraposition between 
sex and gender, a contraposition that, as I have argued in previous papers9, must be 
maintained (at least in medicine). In fact, keeping sex and gender separated is useful to 
better evaluate whether relevant medical differences between individuals can be traced 
back to sex differences (that is, morphological, physiological, and pathophysiological 
differences), gender differences (cultural, historical, psychological, and social 
differences), or a combination of the two variables (which is the most common 
situation); moreover, keeping sex and gender separated is also useful to determine 
when and how these variables affect the clinical features and course of mental disorder, 
and the ways in which healthcare professionals treat their patients.
In the rest of the paper, I will endorse a minimal contraposition between sex and 
gender, and use “sex” with the same meaning as “assigned gender” and “natal gender”.
2. Dualism and pluralism about sex and gender
If sex and gender can be regarded as two different and, to a certain extent, independent 
categories, when a person is assigned a certain sex at birth (male/female), the gender 
(man/woman) cannot be merely inferred on a priori grounds: male/female people 
may self-identify with, experience, and/or express the gender woman/man. All these 
acknowledged variations nonetheless still assume that both the above categories 
come in two different and mutually exclusive forms. Even if there is still a strong 
and widespread presupposition in favor of a strict binary, dualistic system, such a 
presupposition is far from justified.
Briefly considering the notion of sex first, the prevalent opinion until the late 18th 
century did not embrace sex dualism but instead sex monism, that is, the idea that there 
is just one sex. More precisely, female genitalia were thought to be the same as male 
genitalia but directed inside, rather than outside, the body10. From a historical point of 
view sex dualism is thus a fairly recent idea. 
From a biological point of view, it has been argued that sex dualism is not adequate 
to cover all biological variations that can be found in nature11. Focusing on intersex 
people, Fausto-Sterling suggests that it is wrong to think about sex in a dualistic way, 
as if humans were either male or female12. In order to determine whether a particular 
body is male or female, there are different sexual traits to consider: genetic sex (46-
XY vs. 46-XX), gonadal sex (testes vs. ovaries), gametal sex (sperm vs. egg), genital 
sex (sperm-related vs. egg-related plumbing parts, including both internal and external 
genitalia), hormonal sex (more testosterone vs. more estrogen, etcetera), and somatic 
sex (secondary sexual characteristics, such as bodily hair or fat distribution). When the 
sex traits above are all aligned, we have a male body (46-XY, testes, sperm, sperm-
related plumbing parts, more testosterone, etc.) or a female body (46-XX, ovaries, 
egg, egg-related plumbing parts, more estrogen, etc.). Nevertheless, sex traits do not 
necessarily go together, and a particular individual can have a varying mixture of 
them. In the latter case, it is possible to speak of intersex people, whose presence 
clearly shows that sex dualism is not a straightforward option. 
73Maria Cristina Amoretti
In DSM-5, however, the term “intersex”, or “intersexuality”, has been substituted with 
the label “disorders of sex development” (DSD), indicating a “condition of significant 
inborn somatic deviations of the reproductive tract from the norm and/or of discrepancies 
among the biological indicators of male and female”13. Implying that intersex people 
are to be considered disordered because of their “ambiguous” genitalia (which do not 
conform to either of the two traditional kinds of sexed bodies) or a misalignment of 
their sex traits (which, again, contrasts with the dualist idea that defines an individual’s 
sex as either male or female), the label “disorders of sex development” still presupposes 
sex dualism. In previous papers14 I argued that intersexuality should not be considered a 
disease in itself (though it might be associated with various pathological, and sometimes 
even life-threatening, conditions), that intersex people just fall outside strict sex dualism15, 
and thus that it would be important to embrace sex pluralism16, which would be an ethical, 
epistemological, and medical improvement. In this perspective, the DSM should adopt 
less pathologizing labels, such as, for instance, “divergences of sex development”17 or 
“differences of sex development”18, which may all be compatible with sex pluralism.
Moving to the notion of gender, many cultural, sociological, and historical 
studies have convincingly shown that there are not just two alternative and mutually 
incompatible genders but instead a plurality of possible alternatives19. A considerable 
number of people, over time and across different cultures, identify, experience, and/
or express themselves outside of the strict gender dualism that defines an individual’s 
gender as either man or woman. For example, there are people that: 
have no gender (e.g. gender neutral, non-gendered, genderless, agender, neuter, 
neutrois); incorporate aspects of both man and woman (e.g. mixed gender, sometimes 
pangender, androgynous); are to some extent, but not completely, one gender (e.g. demi 
man/boy, demi woman/girl); are of a specific additional gender (either between man 
and woman or otherwise additional to those genders, e.g. third gender, other gender, 
sometimes pangender); move between genders (e.g. bigender, gender fluid, sometimes 
pangender); move between multiple genders (e.g. trigender, sometimes pangender); 
disrupt the gender binary of women and men (e.g. genderqueer, genderfuck)20. 
Independently of the terminology, many people’s realities do not fall within 
any of the two gender categories of man and woman. For example, about one third 
of transgender people primarily self-identity as non-binary21. In this paper, I will 
use the term “genderqueer” as an umbrella term, which aims to group together all 
those different kinds of people who do not self-identify, experience, and/or express 
themselves within the traditional dualism of man and woman22. 
If sex dualism is still assumed, DSM-5 formally abandoned gender dualism, which 
was instead implicit in DSM-IV-TR23. Examining the definition of gender identity, as 
well as some diagnostic criteria of gender dysphoria, it is possible to recognize that 
gender pluralism is officially acknowledged. For example, criterion A1 of gender 
dysphoria in children states: “A strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence 
that one is the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s assigned 
gender)”24. Criteria A4, A5, and A6 of gender dysphoria in adolescents and adults 
contains the same specification25.
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Notwithstanding these explicit admissions in favor of gender pluralism, other 
passages of DSM-5 still presuppose not only strict gender dualism but also gender 
essentialism, that is the idea that men/women have a fixed essence, that is some 
permanent characteristics, attributes, functions, and/or social roles shared in common 
by all men/women at all times. Gender essentialism generally implies that those 
individuals who do not share the whole essence of man/woman are not “real” men/
women, thus increasing stigma and exclusion. 
For instance, the following criteria of gender dysphoria in children are good 
examples of both gender dualism and gender essentialism (see also criterion A3 of 
gender dysphoria in adolescents and adults):
A2: In boys (assigned gender), a strong preference for cross-dressing or simulating 
female attire: or in girls (assigned gender), a strong preference for wearing only typical 
masculine clothing and a strong resistance to the wearing of typical feminine clothing.
A3: A strong preference for cross-gender roles in make-believe play or fantasy play. 
A4: A strong preference for the toys, games, or activities stereotypically used or engaged 
in by the other gender. 
A5: A strong preference for playmates of the other gender. 
A6: In boys (assigned gender), a strong rejection of typically masculine toys, games, 
and activities and a strong avoidance of rough-and-tumble play; or in girls (assigned 
gender), a strong rejection of typically feminine toys, games, and activities26.
Criteria A4 and A5 refer to “the other gender”, thus presupposing the existence of 
only two genders; similarly, criterion A3 refers to “cross-gender roles”, while criterion 
A2 mentions the opposition between masculine and feminine clothing, and criterion 
A6 between masculine and feminine toys as if, again, there were just two genders, 
man/boy and woman/girl. Criterion A6, moreover, refers to “rough-and-tumble play” 
as an essential feature of man/boy, with the implicit implication that someone who 
avoids rough-and-tumble play is not a “real” man/boy. More generally, all the criteria 
above seem to be based on some fixed stereotypical aesthetics and behaviors (kinds 
of clothing, toys, games, activities, etc.), which are supposed to be shared by all men/
women or boys/girls; as a consequence, should some of these features be lacking, then 
the individual would not be a “real” man/boy or woman/girl. 
To repeat, except some formal statements in favor of gender pluralism, the 
diagnostic criteria of gender dysphoria are still the expression of gender dualism and 
gender essentialism. DSM-5 thus seems to ignore the plethora of feminist work which 
criticizes the inherency of gender roles and gender identities. As such, genderqueer 
identities are not seriously considered or understood27.
In order to avoid the conflict between gender pluralism and gender dualism, as well 
as to take into account genderqueer people adequately, the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria 
that still conceal some residue of gender dualism and essentialism should be removed 
or carefully revised. unambiguously adopting a pluralist account of gender is in fact 
an essential step to fully depathologize genderqueer identities and lessen the stigma 
that, regrettably, is still often associated with them.
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3. Gender dysphoria
As already mentioned, the DSM-5 nosology contains a specific disorder directly 
related to the notion of gender, that is gender dysphoria, which is generally defined as 
a marked incongruence between one’s experienced and/or expressed gender and one’s 
assigned gender (or one’s sex)28. In what follows I will use the term “transgender” as 
an umbrella term to refer to people who self-identify with, experience, and/or express 
genders different to their assigned gender.
In DSM-5 gender dysphoria substitutes the DSM-IV-TR nosological category 
of gender identity disorder. Some substantial changes are worth being mentioned 
briefly29. First, the label “dysphoria” substitutes that of “disorder” to indicate that 
this condition pertains to the distress and disability that may be associated with 
the incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender and one’s assigned 
gender, not to the incongruence per se. Second, gender dysphoria is no longer placed 
within sexual dysfunctions and paraphilias but has its own chapter. Third, gender 
dysphoria is described in terms of “incongruence”, not “cross-gender identification”, 
to acknowledge gender pluralism. 
Let us focus on the idea that gender dysphoria pertains to distress and disability. 
As better specified in criterion B, the presence of distress or impairment (disability) 
is a necessary requirement30. Should distress or impairment be absent, no diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria could be made. Again, there is nothing pathological in transgender 
identities per se31. That being said, it is worth asking whether gender dysphoria should 
be still listed among mental disorders at all. 
To a certain extent, the case of gender dysphoria seems to parallel that of 
homosexuality32. In 1973, the nomenclature committee of the APA concluded that 
homosexuality does not regularly cause subjective distress, nor is it regularly associated 
with generalized impairment33. On this basis, in 1974 members of the APA voted with 
a referendum to remove homosexuality per se from the manual. As a consequence, 
homosexuality per se was then replaced with sexual orientation disturbance34 and, 
afterwards, with ego-dystonic homosexuality35 to diagnose those individuals who 
were homosexual and harmed by their condition. As in the case of gender dysphoria, 
diagnoses such as sexual orientation disturbance and ego-dystonic homosexuality 
pertained to the distress and disability possibly associated with homosexuality, not 
to homosexuality per se. In DSM-III-R36, however, even the latter diagnosis was 
eventually removed, as distress and disability, if present, were clearly a consequence 
of the social stigma associated with homosexuality, not of homosexuality ferse37. Such 
a removal represented a watershed in the struggle for reducing the stigma associated 
to homosexual people. Should gender dysphoria be removed too?
According to the subgroup of psychiatrists who had been appointed to revise the 
DSM-IV diagnosis of gender identity disorder, the new diagnosis of gender dysphoria 
has to be regarded as a compromise between two conflicting concerns38. On the one 
hand, the determination to lessen the stigma attached to a nosological category related 
to transgender people; such a stigma, of course, would have been lessened most if 
any nosological category related to transgender people had simply been removed 
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from DSM-5 (as happened for homosexuality). On the other hand, the need to grant 
access to healthcare facilities and insurance coverage for hormonal treatments and 
reassignment surgeries; in some countries, in fact, access to healthcare facilities and 
insurance coverage would only have been granted by retaining a relevant nosological 
category in DSM-5 (clearly, this issue did not apply to homosexuality). 
A diagnostic manual like DSM-5 has to balance different and sometimes conflicting 
issues; thus, it is not surprising that some contradictions may eventually emerge, as in 
the case of gender dysphoria. However, I would argue that, from a theoretical point of 
view, gender dysphoria should be removed from the DSM, no longer considering it 
a mental disorder. Let’s see it better through a review of the main arguments for and 
against the depathologization of gender dysphoria.
First, DSM-5 contains a general definition of mental disorder, a definition that must 
be met by all individual mental disorders:
A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. 
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant distress or disability39.
Very roughly, this definition identifies a mental disorder with a harmful dysfunction, 
where the dysfunction requirement is taken to be a necessary one40. This means that 
in order to include gender dysphoria among mental disorders, one should admit that 
self-identifying with, experiencing, and/or expressing a different gender from the one 
attributed on the basis of one’s sex is per se dysfunctional or at least a pathosuggestive 
symptom41. However, not only does this option have no evidential base but, clearly, 
it is also not in line with DSM-5’s claims. On the one hand, there are no scientifically 
based criteria for differentiating allegedly pathological gender identities from normal 
ones, and the way in which any gender identity develops is still unknown42; on 
the other hand, the new diagnosis of gender dysphoria comes also from the will of 
avoiding the possibility to label non-distressed expressions of gender incongruence 
as mental disorders43. Moreover, it is rather questionable not only that transgender 
identity is usually associated with significant distress or disability, but also that the 
distress and disability that can sometimes be associated with transgender identity, 
and are required by criterion B, are a direct consequence of this condition and not 
instead of the social stigma often associated with it (as in the case of homosexuality)44. 
This may be especially true for children and young adolescents, who are beginning to 
explore their experience of gender and have to simultaneously manage any associated 
social stigma45. Thus, following the DSM-5 claim that “Each disorder identified in 
[…] the manual […] must meet the definition of a mental disorder”46, gender dysphoria 
currently represents a contradiction in the manual and should be thus removed47. 
Second, the 11th edition of the international Classification of Diseases and Health-
Related Conditions (ICD-11) radically modified the classification of transgender identity, 
which in the ICD-10 was dubbed gender identity disorder and included within the 
chapter named Disorders of adult behavior and personality. More precisely, the ICD-11 
changed the diagnostic terminology to gender incongruence, declassified this condition 
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as a mental disorder, and included it within a brand-new chapter named Conditions 
related to sexual health as a separate category. The decision to rename and move gender 
incongruence to a new chapter has been widely welcomed as it was evidence of the 
willingness to depathologize transgender identities, recognize gender variance as a 
normal part of life, and reduce social stigma48. This, however, leads to another theoretical 
problem, as people who fulfil the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria also 
fulfil the ICD-11 diagnostic criteria for gender incongruence, which is now regarded as a 
somatic condition, not as a mental disorder49. In order for the DSM to be in line with the 
latest edition of the ICD (and it is worth noting that harmonizing the two classifications 
as much as possible already was an overarching goal of the DSM-5 taskforce50), then, 
gender dysphoria should be totally removed from the psychiatric nosology.
From a theoretical point of view, the reasons above clearly point towards the 
removal of gender dysphoria from psychiatric nosology. However, could these reasons 
be offset by practical considerations? Removing gender dysphoria from DSM-5, thus 
no longer considering it a mental disorder, could make it difficult for people wishing to 
physically change their body to access to healthcare facilities and insurance coverage 
for hormonal treatment and reassignment surgeries, at least in certain countries. This 
could negatively impact especially on those people with lesser economic means. As 
I mentioned above, being able to grant adequate access to care to transgender people 
was probably the main reason why gender dysphoria was retained in DSM-5. 
That being said, arguing to maintain a diagnostic category in the DSM, thus 
regarding it as a mental disorder, simply because this inclusion makes it easier to 
access to healthcare facilities and insurance coverage for hormonal treatment and 
reassignment surgeries is neither conclusive nor compelling. Of course, this does not 
amount to denying the importance of ensuring adequate access to care to transgender 
people, but rather means recognizing this problem as a social problem, which as such 
should be addressed independently by different means, that is, by disconnecting access 
to transition technologies from a psychiatric diagnosis. In general, there is in fact 
no reason not to grant access to medical care even for perfectly normal conditions, 
such as pregnancy and delivery. In some countries, transgender people are already 
legally recognized and have access to healthcare facilities and insurance coverage 
for hormonal treatment and reassignment surgeries without the need for a psychiatric 
diagnosis51. Moreover, if mental health professionals stop acting as gatekeepers to 
transition services for transgender people, access to care would also be granted to 
those who do not meet criterion B for gender dysphoria but still seek transition.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, I have tried to sketch how the notion of gender is understood in 
psychiatry. First, in DSM-5 sex and gender are taken to be two different categories, as 
there is quite a clear distinction between, on the one hand, gender assignment, which 
is comparable to the notion of sex as it is based on chromosomes and genitalia, and, on 
the other, gender experience, expression, and identity, which are essentially grounded 
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in psychological, social, cultural, and historical features. Even though the dichotomy 
between sex and gender has been questioned by some feminist philosophers, I 
claimed that it is important that it is maintained in psychiatry. Keeping sex and gender 
separated may in fact help to better understand whether relevant medical differences 
between individuals can be traced back to biological differences, social and cultural 
differences, or a combination of the two variables.
Second, even if in DSM-5 gender pluralism seems to be the background assumption, 
some diagnostic criteria are still the manifestation of gender dualism and essentialism, as 
they do not take adequately into account genderqueer identities. These diagnostic criteria 
must be removed or better formulated. There is in fact strong evidence showing that 
genderqueer people are not dysfunctional and, thus, should not be pathologized at all. This 
is an important point that should be made even more explicit in order to lessen the stigma 
and discrimination that, regrettably, is often still associated with genderqueer people.
Third, in DSM-5 the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender 
and one’s assigned gender is not considered a mental disorder in itself, as gender 
dysphoria pertains to distress and disability, not to the incongruence per se. Hence, 
transgender identities are not pathologized per se, but only if associated with distress 
or disability. At any rate, gender dysphoria is still listed among mental disorders 
when, from a theoretical point of view, it should simply be removed from psychiatric 
nosology, as happened for homosexuality. The category of gender dysphoria not only 
does not fit the general definition of mental disorder, thus representing a contradiction 
in DSM-5, but also conflicts with the ICD-11 classification, that regards gender 
incongruence as a somatic condition.
Genderqueer and transgender identities are probably diverse from the majority of 
people but “Diversity is not disease; the anomalous is not the pathological”52. We can 
establish what is pathological only against a background of a pre-established normal, 
which depends not only on biological facts, but also on our cultural values, on what 
we judge to be a bad or negative thing. The depathologization of genderqueer and 
transgender identities, and the removal of gender dysphoria from the DSM, would thus 
reflect inclusive and tolerant values, according to which gender diversity is accepted 
as a normal part of our life, values that should undoubtedly characterize our culture.
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